Does Lumy Investment Matter for Business Cycles? by Miao, Jianjun & Wang, Pengfei
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does Lumy Investment Matter for
Business Cycles?
Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang
Boston University
30. April 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14977/
MPRA Paper No. 14977, posted 2. May 2009 16:13 UTC
Does Lumpy Investment Matter for Business Cycles?∗
Jianjun Miao† Pengfei Wang‡
April 2009
Abstract
We present an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that features
micro-level investment lumpiness. We prove an exact irrelevance proposition which provides
sufficient conditions on preferences, technology, and the fixed cost distribution such that any
positive upper support of the fixed cost distribution yields identical equilibrium dynamics
of the aggregate quantities normalized by their deterministic steady state values. We also
give two conditions for the fixed cost distribution, under which lumpy investment can be
important to a first-order approximation: (i) The steady-state elasticity of the adjustment
rate is large so that the extensive margin effect is large. (ii) More mass is on low fixed costs
so that the general equilibrium price feedback effect is small. Our theoretical results may
reconcile some debate and some numerical findings in the literature.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we present an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that
incorporates micro-level convex and nonconvex adjustment costs. Recent empirical studies
have documented that nonconvexities of microeconomic capital adjustment are widespread
phenomena. Examining a 17-year sample of large, continuing US manufacturing plants, Doms
and Dunne (1998) find that typically more than half of a plant’s cumulative investment occurs
in a single episode. In addition, they find that long periods of relatively small changes are
interrupted by investment spikes. Using the Longitudinal Research Database, Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) find that about 8 percent of observations entail an investment rate near zero.
These observations of inaction are complemented by periods of rather intensive adjustment of
the capital stock. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) also estimate structural parameters of a rich
specification of convex and nonconvex adjustment costs.
Given the above evidence, an important question is whether micro-level nonconvexities
matter for aggregate macroeconomic dynamics.1 This question is under significant debate in
the literature. In a seminal study, Thomas (2002) challenges the previous partial equilibrium
analyses (e.g., Caballero et al. (1995), Caballero and Engel (1999)) by providing a general equi-
librium model with lumpy investment.2 She applies the Dotsey et al. (1999) method and shows
quantitatively that lumpy investment is irrelevant for business cycles. Subsequently, Khan and
Thomas (2003, 2008) build more general models and use a different numerical method (Krusell
and Smith (1998)) to solve the models. They still obtain a similar finding. Their key insight
is that the general equilibrium price feedback effect offsets changes in aggregate investment
demand.3 However, some researchers remain unconvinced by the Khan-Thomas finding. Bach-
mann et al. (2008) and Gourio and Kashyap (2007) argue that both fixed adjustment costs
and general equilibrium price movements are important for business cycle analysis. The rela-
tive importance of these two effects is sensitive to calibration. Both Bachmann et al. (2008)
and Gourio and Kashyap (2007) calibrate a larger size of fixed adjustment costs. Gourio and
Kashyap also argue that for the extensive margin effect to be large, the fixed cost distribution
1Embedding a partial equilibrium model similar to Abel and Eberly (1998) in a continuous-time general
equilibrium framework, Miao (2008) studies the effect of corporate tax policy on long-run equilibrium in the
presence of fixed costs and irreversibility.
2Veracierto (2002) embeds the partial equilibrium costly irreversibility model of Abel and Eberly (1996) in
a general equilibrium business cycles model. Wang and Wen (2009) present a general equilibrium model with
irreversible investment to study aggregate and firm-level volatility.
3House (2008) finds an approximate irrelevance result numerically in a different setup. In his model, the source
of the irrelevance result is not the general equilibrium price movements, but is the nearly infinite intertemporal
substitution for the timing of investment resulting from long-lived capital.
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must be compressed in the sense that many firms face roughly the same sized fixed costs.
One reason causing the debate is due to the complexity of the general equilibrium models
with heterogeneous firms in this literature. Researchers have to apply complicated numerical
methods to solve these models. There is no general theoretical result for comparison. In this
paper, we propose a benchmark analytically tractable general equilibrium model to understand
the debate in the literature. Our model features both convex and nonconvex adjustment costs.
Firms face aggregate labor-augmenting technology shocks and investment-specific technology
shocks. In addition, firms face idiosyncratic fixed cost shocks, resulting in a generalized (S,s)
investment rule as in Caballero and Engel (1999).
Our model is similar to the Khan and Thomas (2003) model with two main differences.
First, we assume that the production function has constant returns to scale rather than de-
creasing returns to scale. Second, we assume that a firm’s fixed costs are proportional to its
existing capital stock rather than labor costs. These two assumptions allow us to exploit the
homogeneity property of firm value to derive a closed-form solution for the generalized (S,s)
investment rule. They also allow us to derive exact aggregation so that we can represent aggre-
gate equilibrium dynamics by a system of nonlinear difference equations as in the real business
cycle (RBC) literature. In particular, the distribution of capital matters only to the extent of
its mean. The benefit of our modelling is that we do not need to use a complicated numerical
method (e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998)) to approximate the distribution of capital. The cost
is that our model cannot address distributional asymmetry and nonlinearity emphasized by
Caballero et al. (1995). Nevertheless, our model is still rich enough for us to analyze business
cycles with the essential feature of micro-level lumpiness, but also is tractable enough for us to
analyze theoretically the effects of intensive margin, extensive margin, and general equilibrium
price movements, which are the most important elements emphasized in the literature.
We derive the following main results. First, we prove an exact irrelevance proposition:
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, preferences are represented by a time-additive
expected utility function consistent with balanced-growth path, and the idiosyncratic fixed
cost shocks are drawn independently and identically from a power function distribution, then
any positive upper support of the fixed cost distribution yields identical equilibrium dynamics
of the aggregate quantities normalized by their deterministic steady-state values.
Second, we derive conditions under which lumpy investment is important for aggregate
dynamics to a first order approximation. Essentially, we need the extensive margin effect to be
large and the general equilibrium price feedback effect to be small. We show that the extensive
margin effect is determined by the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate with respect
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to the investment trigger. The larger is this elasticity, the larger is the extensive margin effect.
The general equilibrium price feedback effect is determined by preferences and the steady-state
ratio of the option value of waiting to the price of capital. When the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is large, the interest rate feedback effect is small. When the fixed cost distribution
is more right skewed (i.e. more firms have small fixed costs), the option value of waiting is
larger, leading to a weaker general equilibrium wage feedback effect.
Third, we show numerically that introducing fixed costs to a model with convex adjustment
costs raises business cycle volatility, but reduces persistence of output, consumption, invest-
ment, and hours. In addition, when lumpy investment becomes more important, it brings
business cycle moments closer to those in the standard frictionless RBC model.
Our theoretical results may reconcile some of the debate and some of the numerical findings
in the literature. For example, Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) find that when they increase
the maximal fixed cost by 10 folds, the equilibrium dynamics nearly have no change. This
could be due to the fact that they assume a uniform distribution of fixed costs and a nearly
constant-returns-to-scale production function (their calibrated value of returns to scale is 0.905
or 0.896). For the maximal size of fixed costs to matter, we need the production function to
have high curvature as shown numerically by Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and Caballero et
al. (2008). Gourio and Kashyap (2007) also argue that the fixed cost distribution must be
compressed. We show that this feature of the distribution is not essential. What is essential
is that the fixed cost distribution must be right skewed and must have a high steady-state
elasticity of the adjustment rate.
We emphasize that the size of total fixed costs is not essential for the lumpy investment to
be important. Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and Caballero et al. (2008) argue that Khan and
Thomas calibrated fixed costs are too small and that raising the size of total fixed costs will
make lumpy investment more important. By contrast, we use numerical examples to show that
even the size of fixed costs is smaller, lumpy investment can be more important for the reason
discussed before.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes equilibrium properties. Section 4 provides numerical results. Section 5 introduces
idiosyncratic investment-specific technology shocks in order to generate differences in target
investment levels across firms, thereby helping match the spike rate observed in the data. For
tractability, we assume fixed costs are constant. In this case, we still obtain an exact irrelevance
result: Given the preceding assumptions on preferences and technology, if the idiosyncratic
investment-specific shocks are drawn independently and identically from a Pareto distribution,
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then any positive constant fixed costs yield identical equilibrium dynamics of the normalized
aggregate quantities. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Model
We consider an infinite horizon economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... There
is a continuum of heterogeneous production units, indexed by j and distributed uniformly over
[0, 1] . We identify a production unit with a firm or a plant. There is a continuum of identical
households, who trade all firms’ shares. Each firm is subject to aggregate labor-augmenting
productivity shocks and investment-specific technology shocks. In addition, each firm is subject
to idiosyncratic shocks to fixed adjustment costs of investments. To focus on the implications
of fixed costs for business cycles, we abstract from long-run growth. It is straightforward to
incorporate growth because our model assumptions are consistent with balanced growth.
2.1 Firms
All firms have identical production technology that combines labor and capital to produce
output. Specifically, if firm j owns capital Kjt and hires labor N
j
t , it produces output Y
j
t
according to the production function:
Y jt = F
(
Kjt , AtN
j
t
)
, (1)
where At represents aggregate labor-augmenting technology shocks and follows a Markov pro-
cess given by:
lnAt+1 = ρA lnAt +
√
1− ρ2A σAeA,t+1.
Here, ρA ∈ (0, 1) , σA > 0 and eA,t is an identically and independently distributed (iid) standard
normal random variable. Assume that F is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously
differentiable, and satisfies the usual Inada conditions. In addition, it has constant returns to
scale.
Each firm j may make investments Ijt to increase its existing capital stock K
j
t . Investment
incurs both nonconvex and convex adjustment costs. As in Uzawa (1969), Baxter and Crucini
(1993), and Jermann (1998), capital accumulation follows the law of motion:
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)Kjt +KjtΦ
(
Ijt
Kjt
)
, Kj0 given, (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Φ represents convex adjustment costs. To facilitate an-
alytical solutions, we follow Jermann (1998) and specify the convex adjustment cost function
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as:
Φ (x) =
ψ
1− θx
1−θ + ς, (3)
where ψ > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) . Nonconvex adjustment costs are fixed costs that must be paid if and
only if the firm chooses to invest. As in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), we measure these costs
as a fraction of the firm’s capital stock.4 That is, if firm j makes new investment, then it pays
fixed costs ξjtK
j
t , which is independent of the amount of investment. As will be clear later, this
modeling of fixed costs is important to ensure that firm value is linearly homogenous. Following
Caballero and Engel (1999), we assume that ξjt is identically and independently drawn from a
distribution with density φ over [0, ξmax] across firms and across time.
Each firm j pays dividends to households who are shareholders of the firm. Dividends are
given by:
Djt = Y
j
t − wtN jt −
Ijt
zt
− ξjtKjt 1Ijt 6=0 (4)
where wt is the wage rate, and zt represents aggregate investment-specific technology shocks.
Here 1
Ijt 6=0 is an indicator function taking value 1 if I
j
t 6= 0, and value 0, otherwise. Assume zt
follows a Markov process given by:
ln zt+1 = ρz ln zt +
√
1− ρ2z σzez,t+1,
where ρz ∈ (0, 1) , σz > 0, and ez,t is an iid standard normal random variable. All random
variables At, zt and ξ
j
t are mutually independent.
Firm j’s objective is to maximize cum-dividends market value of equity P jt :
max P jt ≡ Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
βs
Λt+s
Λt
Djt+s
]
, (5)
subject to (2) and (4). Here, βsΛt+s/Λt is the stochastic discount factor between period t and
t+ s. We will show later that Λt+s is a household’s marginal utility in period t+ s.
2.2 Households
All households are identical and have the same utility function:
E
[
βt
∞∑
t=0
U (Ct, 1−Nt)
]
, (6)
4There are several ways to model fixed adjustment costs in the literature. Fixed costs may be proportional to
the demand shock (Abel and Eberly (1998)), profits (Caballero and Engel (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006)), or labor costs (Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008)).
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and
continuously differentiable function that satisfies the usual Inada conditions. Each household
chooses consumption Ct, labor supply Nt, and share holdings α
j
t+1 to maximize utility (6)
subject to the budget constraint:
Ct +
∫
αjt+1
(
P jt −Djt
)
dj =
∫
αjtP
j
t dj + wtNt. (7)
The first-order conditions are given by:
Λt
(
P jt −Djt
)
= EtβΛt+1P
j
t+1, (8)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) = Λt, (9)
U2 (Ct, 1−Nt) = Λtwt. (10)
Equations (8)-(9) imply that the stock price P jt is given by the discounted present value of
dividends as in equation (5). In addition, Λt is equal to the marginal utility of consumption.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
The sequences of quantities {Ijt , N jt ,Kjt }t≥0, {Ct, Nt}t≥0, and prices {wt, P jt }t≥0 for j ∈ [0, 1]
constitute a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Given prices {wt}t≥0 , {Ijt , N jt }t≥0 solves firm j’s problem (5) subject to the law of motion
(2).
(ii) Given prices
{
wt, P
j
t
}
t≥0
, {Ct, Nt, αjt+1}t≥0 maximizes utility in (6) subject to the
budget constraint (7).
(iii) Markets clear in that:
αjt = 1,
Nt =
∫
N jt dj,
Ct +
∫
Ijt
zt
dj +
∫
ξjtK
j
t 1Ijt 6=0dj =
∫
F
(
Kjt , AtN
j
t
)
dj. (11)
3 Equilibrium Properties
We start by analyzing a single firm’s optimal investment policy, holding prices fixed. We then
conduct aggregation and characterize equilibrium aggregate dynamics by a system of nonlinear
difference equations. We show that the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Next, we analyze
steady state and prove an exact irrelevance result. Finally, we log-linearize the equilibrium
dynamic system and examine the conditions under which lumpy investment can be important.
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3.1 Optimal Investment Policy
To simplify problem (5), we first solve a firm’s static labor choice decision. Let njt = N
j
t /K
j
t .
The first-order condition with respect to labor yields:
f ′
(
Atn
j
t
)
At = wt, (12)
where we define f (·) = F (1, ·) . This equation reveals that all firms choose the same labor-
capital ratio in that njt = nt = n(wt, At) for all j. We can then derive firm j’s operating
profits:
max
Njt
F
(
Kjt , AtN
j
t
)
− wtN jt = RtKjt ,
where Rt = f(Atnt) − wtnt is independent of j. Note that Rt also represents the marginal
product of capital because F has constant returns to scale. Let ijt = I
j
t /K
j
t denote firm j’s
investment rate. We can then express dividends in (4) as:
Djt =
[
Rt − i
j
t
zt
− ξjt1ijt 6=0
]
Kjt ,
and rewrite (2) as
Kjt+1 =
[
(1− δ) + Φ(ijt )
]
Kjt . (13)
The above two equations imply that equity value or firm value are linear in capital Kjt . We
can then write firm value as V jt K
j
t and rewrite problem (5) by dynamic programming:
V jt K
j
t = max
ijt
[
Rt − i
j
t
zt
− ξjt1ijt 6=0
]
Kjt + Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
V jt+1K
j
t+1
]
, (14)
subject to (13). Substituting equation (13) into equation (14), we rewrite problem (14) as:
V jt = max
ijt
Rt − i
j
t
zt
− ξjt1ijt 6=0 + g(i
j
t )Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
V jt+1
]
, (15)
where we define:
g(ijt ) = 1− δ +Φ(ijt ). (16)
Note that Rt and Λt depend on current aggregate state (Kt, At, zt) only. Suppose the equilib-
rium law of motion for aggregate capital is given by:
Kt+1 = G (Kt, At, zt) . (17)
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Given this law of motion, Λt+1 is also a function of (Kt, At, zt) . Thus, the state variable for V
j
t
is (Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t ). We can write it as
V jt = V
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
,
for some function V.We aggregate each firm’s price of capital V jt and define the aggregate value
of the firm per unit of capital conditioned on aggregate state (Kt, At, zt) as:
V¯t = V¯ (Kt, At, zt) =
∫ ξmax
0
V (Kt, At, zt, ξ)φ(ξ)dξ, (18)
for some function V¯ . Because ξjt is iid across both time and firms and is independent of aggregate
shocks, we obtain:
Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
V jt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
∫ ξmax
0
V (Kt+1, At+1, zt+1, ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
V¯t+1
]
, (19)
We can now rewrite problem (15) as:
V
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
= max
ijt
Rt − i
j
t
zt
− ξjt1ijt 6=0 + g(i
j
t )Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
V¯t+1
]
, (20)
where Rt, Λt, Λt+1, and V¯t+1 depend on the aggregate state (Kt, At, zt) and the aggregate
capital stock follows the law of motion (17). Firm j takes these variables and the aggregate
law of motion as given. From problem (20), we can characterize a firm’s optimal investment
policy by a generalized (S,s) rule (Caballero and Engel (1999)). In so doing, we first define
(aggregate) marginal Q as the (risk-adjusted) present value of a marginal unit of investment:
Qt = Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
V¯t+1
]
. (21)
Since investment becomes productive with a one period delay, marginal Q is equal to the
discounted expected value of the firm of an additional unit of capital in the next period. In
continuous time, the difference between marginal Q and the aggregate price of capital V¯t+1
disappears. Because firm value is linearly homogeneous in capital, Tobin’s average Q is equal
to the marginal Q (Hayashi (1982)).
Proposition 1 Firm j’s optimal investment policy is characterized by the (S, s) policy in that
there is a unique trigger value ξ∗t > 0 such that the firm invests if and only if ξ
j
t ≤ min{ξ∗t , ξmax}.
The trigger value ξ∗t satisfies the equation:
θ
1− θz
1−θ
θ
t (ψQt)
1
θ = ξ∗t . (22)
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The optimal target investment level is given by:
ijt = (ψztQt)
1
θ . (23)
When ξ∗t ≤ ξmax, marginal Q satisfies:
Qt = Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
{
Rt+1 + (1− δ + ς)Qt+1 +
∫ ξ∗t+1
0
[
ξ∗t+1 − ξ
]
φ(ξ)dξ
}]
. (24)
Equation (22) says that, at the value ξ∗t , the benefit from investment is equal to the fixed cost
of investment. The benefit from investment increases with Qt and zt. Thus, the investment
trigger ξ∗t also increases with Qt and zt. If ξ∗t ≥ ξmax, then the firm always invests. In the
aggregate with a cross section of firms, this means that all firms decide to invest. In the
analysis below, we will focus on an interior solution for which ξ∗t < ξmax.
Note that the investment trigger ξ∗t depends on the aggregate state (Kt, At, zt) only. It
does not depend on the firm-specific state (Kjt , ξ
j
t ). This observation implies that conditioned
on the aggregate state, the adjustment hazard,
∫ ξ∗t
0 φ (ξ) dξ, is a constant. This result is due
to our assumptions of competitive markets, constant-returns-to-scale production function, and
the iid distribution of ξjt . When the production function has decreasing returns to scale or
there is monopoly power, the investment trigger ξ∗t and the adjustment hazard will depend on
the firm-specific capital stock, as discussed in Caballero et al. (1995), Caballero and Engel
(1999), and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008).
Equation (23) implies that all firms choose identical target investment level, which is incon-
sistent with empirical evidence on investment spikes (Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). One
way to make investment targets depend on firm-specific characteristics is to introduce persistent
idiosyncratic productivity shock (Khan and Thomas (2008)). This extension will complicate
our analysis significantly, and is left for future research. An alternative way is to introduce
idiosyncratic investment-specific shocks. We will study this setup in Section 5.
Equation (23) shows that the optimal investment level is positively related to marginal Q
if and only if the firm’s idiosyncratic shock ξjt is lower than the trigger value ξ
∗
t , conditioned
on the aggregate state (Kt, At, zt) . When ξ
j
t > ξ
∗
t , firm j chooses not to invest. This zero
investment is unrelated to marginal Q. As a result, investment may not be related to marginal
Q in the presence of fixed adjustment costs, a point made by Caballero and Leahy (1996).
Equation (24) is a type of asset-pricing equation. Ignoring the integration term inside the
conditional expectation operator in equation (24), this equation states that the expected price
of capital or marginal Q is equal to the risk-adjusted present value of marginal product of
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capital. The integration term in (24) reflects the option value of waiting because of the fixed
adjustment costs. When the shock ξjt > ξ
∗
t , it is not optimal to pay the fixed costs to make
investment. Firms will wait to invest until ξjt ≤ ξ∗t and there is an option value of waiting.
3.2 Aggregation and Equilibrium Characterization
Given the linear homogeneity feature of firm value, we can conduct aggregation tractably. We
define aggregate capital Kt =
∫
Kjt dj, aggregate labor demand Nt =
∫
N jt dj, aggregate output
Yt =
∫
Y jt dj, and aggregate investment expenditure in consumption units It =
∫
Ijt /ztdj.
Proposition 2 The aggregate equilibrium sequences {Yt, Nt, Ct, It, Kt, Qt, ξ∗t }t≥0 are charac-
terized by the following system of difference equations:
ξ∗t =
θ
1− θz
1−θ
θ
t (ψQt)
1
θ , (25)
It = (ψQt)
1
θ z
1−θ
θ
t
[∫ ξ∗t
0
φ(ξ)dξ
]
Kt, (26)
Kt+1 = (1− δ + ς)Kt + ψ1− θKt (ztIt/Kt)
1−θ
[∫ ξ∗t
0
φ(ξ)dξ
]θ
, (27)
Yt = F (Kt, AtNt) = It + Ct +Kt
∫ ξ∗t
0
ξφ(ξ)dξ, (28)
U2 (Ct, 1−Nt)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) = AtF2 (Kt, AtNt) , (29)
Qt = Et
{
βU1 (Ct+1, 1−Nt+1)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) [F1 (Kt+1, At+1Nt+1) + (1− δ + ς)Qt+1
+
∫ ξ∗t+1
0
(
ξ∗t+1 − ξ
)
φ(ξ)dξ
]}
. (30)
Equation (25) is identical to (22). We derive equations (26) and (27) by aggregating equa-
tions (2) and (23). Equation (26) shows that aggregate investment rate It/Kt is positively
related to marginal Q as predicted by the standard Q-theory. However, unlike this theory,
marginal Q is not a sufficient statistic for the investment rate. In particular, the aggregate
state (Kt, At, zt) also helps explain the aggregate investment rate besides marginal Q, via its
effect on ξ∗t .
Equation (28) is the resource constraint. The last term in the equation represents the
aggregate fixed adjustment costs. The first equality of equation (28) gives the aggregate output
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using a single firm’s production function F . This result is primarily due to the constant returns
to scale property of F. The representative household’s consumption/leisure choice gives equation
(29). Equation (30) is an asset pricing for the price of capital Q. It is obtained from equation
(24). Note that by equations (26) and (25), we can show that the option value of waiting in
the second line of (30) is equal to θ1−θ
It+1
Kt+1
− ∫ ξ∗t0 ξφ(ξ)dξ.
3.3 Constrained Efficiency
Is the competitive equilibrium we studied efficient? To answer this question, we consider a
social planner’s problem in which he faces the same investment frictions as individual firms.
Suppose the planner selects an investment trigger ξ∗t such that all firms make investments when
the idiosyncratic fixed adjustment cost shock ξt ≤ ξ∗t . We can then aggregate individual firms’
capital and investments to obtain the resource constraint (28) and the capital accumulation
equation (27). The social planner’s problem is to maximize the representative agent’s utility
(6) subject to these two equations.
Proposition 3 The competitive equilibrium allocation and the investment trigger characterized
in Proposition 2 are constrained efficient in the sense that they are identical to those obtained
by solving a social planner’s problem.
3.4 Steady State
We consider a deterministic steady state in which there is no aggregate shock to labor augment-
ing technology and no aggregate shock to investment-specific technology, but there is still id-
iosyncratic fixed costs shock. In this case, steady-state aggregate variables (Y,C,N,K, I,Q, ξ∗)
are deterministic constants by a law of large numbers.
Proposition 4 Consider the lumpy investment model. Suppose δ > ς and
δ − ς < ξ
1−θ
maxψ
(1− θ)θ θ(1−θ)
∫ ξmax
0
φ(ξ)dξ.
Then the steady-state investment trigger ξ∗ ∈ (0, ξmax) is the unique solution to the equation:
δ − ς = ξ
∗1−θψ
(1− θ)θ θ(1−θ)
∫ ξ∗
0
φ(ξ)dξ. (31)
Given this value ξ∗, the steady-state value of Q is given by:
Q =
1
ψ
(
ξ∗ (1− θ)
θ
)θ
. (32)
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The other steady-state values (I,K,C,N) satisfy:
I
K
= (δ − ς) (1− θ)Q, (33)
F (K,N) = I + C +K
∫ ξ∗
0
ξφ (ξ) dξ, (34)
U2 (C, 1−N)
U1 (C, 1−N) = F2 (K,N) , (35)
Q =
β
1− β (1− δ + ς)
{
F1 (K,N) +
∫ ξ∗
0
(ξ∗ − ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
}
. (36)
The investment trigger ξ∗ is uniquely determined by equation (31), which states that,
for the aggregate capital stock to be constant over time, new investment must offset capital
depreciation. The steady-state aggregate price of capital is determined by equation (32), which
follows from equation (25). At this price, a firm is just willing to pay the fixed cost to invest
if the shock to its new investment just hits the trigger value ξ∗.
The other steady-state values (I,K,C,N) are determined by a system of four equations
(33)-(36). In particular, equation (33) implies that the steady-state investment rate increases
with the aggregate price of capital Q. Equation (36) shows that Q must satisfy a steady-state
version of an asset-pricing equation, which states that it is equal to the present value of the
marginal product of capital plus the option value of waiting.
We are unable to derive analytical comparative statics results for the steady sate values of
(I,K,C,N) under general conditions because they are determined by a system of four nonlinear
equations. If we make some specific assumptions on preferences and technology, we have the
following sharp comparative statics results:
Corollary 1 Consider the power function distribution with density φ (ξ) = ηξ
η−1
(ξmax)
η , η > 0.
Assume that the parameter values are such that the inequality in (37) holds. Then the steady-
state trigger value is given by:
ξ∗ =
[
ψ−1 (δ − ς) (1− θ)θ θ(1−θ)ξηmax
] 1
η+1−θ
< ξmax. (37)
In addition, consider the following specifications:
F (K,AN) = Kα(AN)1−α, α ∈ (0, 1) , (38)
U (C, 1−N) =
{
C1−γ
1−γ v(1−N) if γ > 0, 6= 1
log (C) + v(1−N) if γ = 1 , (39)
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where v is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfies the
Inada conditions. Then the steady-state values R/Q, I/Y,C/Y and N are independent of
ξmax. In addition,
∂ (I/K)
∂ξmax
> 0,
∂Q
∂ξmax
> 0,
∂R
∂ξmax
> 0,
∂w
∂ξmax
< 0, (40)
∂K
∂ξmax
< 0,
∂Y
∂ξmax
< 0,
∂C
∂ξmax
< 0, and
∂I
∂ξmax
< 0. (41)
As ξmax increases, the power function distribution is more spread out. Thus, less firms
will adjust capital for a given investment trigger. To raise the aggregate investment rate to
compensate capital depreciation, the steady-state investment trigger ξ∗ must rise, as shown
in equation (37). As a result, the steady-state investment rate I/K and Q increase with
ξmax. Under the additional assumptions on preferences and technology, both I and K decrease
with ξmax, but K decreases faster than I. This in turn implies that the steady-state output
Y and consumption C decrease with ξmax. In addition, the steady-state rental rate of capital
R increases with ξmax, but the steady-state wage rate w decreases with ξmax because capital
becomes relatively scarce.
The surprising result is that the steady-state values of R/Q, I/Y,C/Y and N are indepen-
dent of ξmax. An important assumption for this result is that the distribution of the fixed costs
is a power function, which has a homogeneity property. Our assumed functions for preferences
and technology also have a homogeneity property. These two homogeneity properties are key
to the independence result. We emphasize that the assumptions on preferences and technology
in Corollary 1 are standard in macroeconomics and are consistent with balanced growth (e.g.,
King et al. (2002)). We next use Corollary 1 to study aggregate dynamics.
3.5 An Exact Irrelevance Result
We normalize an aggregate variable by its steady-state value characterized in Proposition 4.
We let X˜t = Xt/X denote this normalized value of Xt when its deterministic steady-state value
is X. We have the following irrelevance result:
Proposition 5 Suppose the assumptions in Corollary 1 are satisfied. Then any maximal fixed
cost ξmax > 0 does not affect the equilibrium system of nonlinear difference equations that
characterizes aggregate dynamics of the normalized variables {Y˜t, N˜t, C˜t, I˜t, K˜t, Q˜t, ξ˜∗t }t≥0.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the maximal fixed cost ξmax > 0 matters for aggregate
dynamics only to the extent that it affects the steady state. The system of difference equations
13
that characterizes the normalized variables relative to their steady-state values do not depend
on ξmax. As a result, ξmax does not affect the second moment and impulse response properties
of the normalized aggregate variables or the logarithms of these variables.
The intuition behind this proposition is that the system of nonlinear difference equations for
the normalized equilibrium variables has a homogeneity property so that it is fully determined
by the model parameters except for ξmax and the steady-state values R/Q, I/Y,C/Y and N.
By Corollary 1, these steady state values are also independent of ξmax. Thus, the dynamic
system is independent of ξmax. The key condition for this result is that the distribution of the
idiosyncratic fixed cost shock is a power function. Other conditions are standard in the RBC
literature.
We emphasize that this result does not imply that aggregate dynamics with fixed adjustment
costs (ξmax > 0) are the same as those in a model without fixed adjustment costs (ξmax =
0), because the dynamic systems of the (normalized) aggregate variables in the two models
are different. That is, there is discontinuity when ξmax moves from 0 to a positive number.
Importantly, the shape of the fixed cost distribution plays an important role in the lumpy
adjustment model. To analyze this issue more transparently, we next consider a log-linearized
equilibrium system.
3.6 Log-Linearized System
We first note that the equilibrium wage rate wt = AtF2 (Kt, AtNt) and the equilibrium gross
interest rate rt+1 satisfies U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) = Et [βU1 (Ct+1, 1−Nt+1) rt+1] . Using these two
equations, we log-linearize the dynamic system given in Proposition 2 around the deterministic
steady state and obtain the following proposition after some tedious algebra. We use Xˆt =
(Xt −X) /X to denote the deviation of a variable Xt from its steady state value X.
Proposition 6 The log-linearized equilibrium dynamic system is given by:
ξˆ∗t =
1− θ
θ
zˆt +
1
θ
Qˆt, (42)
Iˆt − Kˆt =
(
1
θ
Qˆt +
1− θ
θ
zˆt
)
+
ξ∗φ(ξ∗)∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
ξˆ∗t , (43)
Kˆt+1 = (1− δ + ς)Kˆt + θKˆt + (1− θ)(Iˆt + zˆt) + θξ
∗φ(ξ∗)∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
ξˆ∗t , (44)
Yˆt =
F1K
Y
Kˆt +
(
1− F1K
Y
)
[Aˆt + Nˆt], (45)
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Yˆt =
I
Y
Iˆt +
C
Y
Cˆt +
(
1− I
Y
− C
Y
)[
Kˆt +
(ξ∗)2 φ(ξ∗)∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξˆ∗t
]
, (46)
Qˆt = βEtQˆt+1 − Etrˆt+1 + β(δ − ς)(1− θ)Etzˆt+1 (47)
+
−F11F2
F21F1
βR
Q
Et
[
Aˆt+1 − wˆt+1
]
,
Etrˆt+1 = uC,CCˆt − uC,N Nˆt −Et
(
uC,CCˆt+1 − uC,N Nˆt+1
)
, (48)
wˆt = (uN,C − uC,C)Cˆt + (uC,N − uN,N )Nˆt
=
KF21
F2
Kˆt +
NF22
F2
Nˆt +
(
1 +
NF22
F2
)
Aˆt, (49)
where we denote uN,C =
CU21(C,1−N)
U2(C,1−N) , uN,N =
NU22(C,1−N)
U2(C,1−N) , uC,C =
CU11(C,1−N)
U1(C,1−N) , and uC,N =
NU12(C,1−N)
U1(C,1−N) .
This proposition demonstrates explicitly how parameters for preferences, technology, and
the fixed cost distribution determine the log-linearized equilibrium system. Equation (42) shows
that changes in the investment-specific technology shock or in the price of capital determine
changes in the investment trigger, and thus changes in the likelihood of capital adjustment
and in the number of adjustors. This effect is often referred to as the extensive margin effect.
Equation (43) shows that changes in the aggregate investment rate are determined by an
intensive margin effect and an extensive margin effect. The intensive margin effect represented
by the expression in the bracket on the right hand side of (43) determines the size of the
aggregate investment rate. The magnitude of the extensive margin effect on the aggregate
investment rate is determined by the steady-state elasticity the adjustment rate with respect
to the investment trigger, ξ∗φ(ξ∗)/
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ. In order for lumpy investment to matter for
business cycles, the extensive margin effect must be large. This requires the elasticity of the
adjustment rate with respect to the investment trigger to be large. We will give some examples
in the next section to illustrate this point.
Both the intensive margin and extensive margin effects are affected by the general equi-
librium price movements because changes in the wage rate and in the interest rate affect the
changes in the price of capital, as revealed by equation (47). The change in the interest rate
is determined by preferences. As equation (48) shows, when the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is larger, the consumption smoothing incentive is stronger, leading to a smaller
interest rate movement.
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The magnitude of the wage movements is determined by the preferences and technology
parameters as revealed by equation (49). Equation (47) shows that the wage feedback effect is
magnified by the steady-state ratio of the marginal product of capital to Q or R/Q. Because the
steady-state Q is equal to the present value of R and the option value of waiting as revealed by
(36), the larger is the option value of waiting, the smaller is R/Q.We can show that holding the
adjustment rate and the investment trigger fixed, if more low fixed costs have high probabilities
or the fixed cost distribution is more right skewed, the option value of waiting is higher. In
this case, R/Q is smaller and thus the wage feedback effect is smaller.
In summary, both the micro-level investment lumpiness and the general equilibrium price
movements are important to determine aggregate dynamics. The relative importance of these
two effects is determined by the preference and technology parameters and the distribution of
the idiosyncratic fixed cost shock. In particular, holding preferences and technology fixed, if
the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate is larger, then the extensive margin effect is
stronger. If the fixed cost distribution is more right skewed, then the general equilibrium wage
feedback effect is weaker.
4 Numerical Results
We evaluate our lumpy investment model quantitatively and compare this model with two
benchmark models. The first one is a frictionless RBC model, obtained by removing all ad-
justment costs in the model presented in Section 2. In particular, we set ξjt = θ = ς = 0 and
ψ = 1. The second one is obtained by removing fixed adjustment costs only (ξjt = 0). We call
this model partial adjustment model.
In both benchmark models, all firms make identical decisions, and thus these models are
equivalent to standard representative-firm RBC models (e.g., Fisher (2006) and Greenwood et
al. (2000). Specifically, the equilibrium for the partial adjustment economy is characterized by
equations (26)-(30), where we set ξ∗t = 0. The equilibrium for the frictionless RBC economy is
characterized by equations (27)-(30), where we set Qt = 1/zt, ξ∗t = 0, θ = ς = 0, and ψ = 1.
Because we have characterized the equilibria for all three models by systems of nonlinear
difference equations as shown in the previous section, we can use the standard second-order
approximation method to solve the models numerically.5 To do so, we need first to calibrate
the models.
5The Dynare code is available upon request.
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4.1 Baseline Parametrization
For all model economies, we take the Cobb-Douglas production function, F (K,AN) = Kα (AN)1−α ,
and the period utility function, U (C, 1−N) = log(C)− aN, where a > 0 is a parameter. We
fix the length of period to correspond to one year, as in Thomas (2002), and Khan and Thomas
(2003, 2008). Annual frequency allows us to use empirical evidence on establishment-level
investment in selecting parameters for the fixed adjustment costs and the distribution of id-
iosyncratic investment-specific shocks.
We first choose parameter values for preferences and technology to ensure that the steady-
state of the frictionless RBC model is consistent with the long-run values of key postwar U.S.
aggregates. Specifically, we set the subjective discount factor to β = 0.96, so that the implied
annual real interest rate is 4 percent (Prescott (1986)). We choose the value of a so that the
steady-state hours are about 1/3 of available time spent in market work. We set the capital
share α = 0.36, implying a labor share of 0.64, which is close to the labor income share in the
NIPA. We take the depreciate rate δ = 0.1, as in the literature on business cycles (e.g., Prescott
(1986)).
It is often argued that convex adjustment costs are not observable directly and hence cannot
be calibrated based on average data over the long run (e.g., Greenwood et al. (2000)). Thus,
we impose the two restrictions:
ψ = δθ and ς =
−θ
1− θ δ, (50)
so that the partial adjustment model and the frictionless RBC model give identical steady-state
allocations.6 As in our paper, Baxter and Crucini (1993), Jermann (1998), and Greenwood et
al. (2000) make similar assumptions for the parameters in the adjustment cost function. We
assume condition (50) throughout our numerical experiments below.
We next follow Khan and Thomas (2003) to select parameters for the aggregate shocks.
They use Stock and Watson (1999) data set to estimate the persistence and volatility of
the Solow residuals equal to 0.9225 and 0.0134, respectively. Transforming the total fac-
tor productivity shocks to our labor-augmenting technology shocks, we set ρA = 0.9225 and
σA = 0.0134/0.64 = 0.02 1. As in Khan and Thomas (2003), we set ρz = 0.706 and σz = 0.017 in
the investment-specific technology shock process. Following Kiyotaki and West (1996), Thomas
(2002), and Khan and Thomas (2003), we set θ = 1/5.98, implying that the Q-elasticity of the
investment rate is 5.98.
6Under the log-linear approximation method, only the curvature parameter θ in the convex adjustment cost
function matters for the approximated equilibrium dynamics.
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We adopt the power function distribution for the idiosyncratic fixed cost shock. We need to
calibrate two parameters ξmax and η. We try to match micro-level evidence on the investment
lumpiness reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) find
that the inaction rate is 0.081 and the positive spike rate is about 0.186. A positive investment
spike is defined as the investment rate exceeding 0.2. For the power function distribution,
the steady-state inaction rate is given by 1− (ξ∗/ξmax)η and the steady-state investment rate
is given by equation (33). Because our model implies that the target investment rate I/K
is identical for all firms, our model cannot match the spike rate. Therefore, there are many
combinations of η and ξmax to match the inaction rate. As baseline values, we follow Khan and
Thomas (2003, 2008) and take a uniform distribution (η = 1). This implies that ξmax = 0.0242.
In this case, total fixed adjustment costs account for 2.4 percent of output, 10 percent of total
investment spending and 1.0 percent of capital stock, which are reasonable according to the
estimation by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
We summarize the baseline parameter values in Table 1.
Table 1. Baseline Parameter Vales
β a α δ ρA σA ρz σz θ ξmax η
0.9615 2.5843 0.36 0.1 0.9225 0.021 0.706 0.017 1/5.98 0.0242 1
4.2 Partial Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to understand the general equilibrium effects of fixed costs on business cycles, we
start with a partial equilibrium analysis by fixing the wage rate and the interest rate at their
steady state values. For the power function distribution, we can show that the elasticity of the
adjustment rate is equal to η. Using assumption (50), the specification of the utility function
and the production function, and setting wˆt = rˆt = 0, we can rewrite equations (43) and (47)
as:
Iˆt − Kˆt = 1
θ
Qˆt +
1− θ
θ
zˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
+ ηξˆ∗t︸︷︷︸
extensive
, (51)
Qˆt = βEtQˆt+1 + δβEtzˆt+1 +
[
1−
(
1− δ
1− θ
)
β − βθδ
1− θ
1
1 + η
]
1− α
α
EtAˆt+1. (52)
The last term in the square bracket in equation (52) represents the option value of waiting in
the presence of fixed costs. The log-linearized system for the partial adjustment model with
fixed prices is obtained by setting η = 0 and ignoring equation (42).
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We now analyze the impulse response properties based on the above log-linearized system.
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to the labor-
augmenting technology (N-shock). Following this shock, the marginal product capital rises.
Thus, the price of capital or the marginal Q rises. Because there is an option value of waiting,
the increase in Q is higher in the lumpy investment model than in the partial adjustment
model. The increase in Q has both an intensive and extensive margin effects in the lumpy
investment model as revealed by equation (43). In particular, it raises the adjustment rate by
11 percent in the lumpy investment model. Due to this extensive margin effect, the increase
in the investment rate in the lumpy investment model is also higher than that in the partial
adjustment model (22 percent versus 10 percent).
[Insert Figures 1-2 Here.]
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to the
investment-specific technology (I-shock). Following this shock, the marginal Q rises by the
same magnitude in both the lumpy investment and in the partial adjustment model because
these two models deliver an identical coefficient of zˆt in (52). Even though the increase in
marginal Q is identical, the investment rate increases much more in the lumpy investment
model than in the partial adjustment model (15 percent versus 8 percent). The reason is
that the investment-specific technology shock has a direct extensive margin effect by raising
the adjustment rate (see equation (42)). In particular, the adjustment rate rises by about 8
percent.
4.3 General Equilibrium Dynamics
We now turn to general equilibrium dynamics by endogenizing the prices. In this case, the
general equilibrium price movements play an important role in shaping aggregate dynamics.
To see this, we write the log-linearized equation for the marginal Q as:
Qˆt = βEtQˆt+1 + βδEtzˆt+1 −Et [rˆt+1] (53)
+
[
1−
(
1− δ
1− θ
)
β − βθδ
1− θ
1
1 + η
]
1− α
α
Et[At+1 − wˆt+1],
where the equilibrium interest rate and wage rate satisfy
Et [rˆt+1] = Et
[
Cˆt+1
]
− Cˆt,
wˆt = Cˆt = (1− α) Aˆt + α
(
Kˆt − Nˆt
)
.
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In general equilibrium, a positive N-shock or I-shock raises the interest rate and the wage
rate, and thus dampens the increases in the marginal Q or the price of capital, as revealed
by equation (53). As a result, both the extensive and intensive margin effects are weakened
in general equilibrium. Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) emphasize this
general equilibrium effect. They also find that movements in interest rates and wages yield
quantity dynamics that are virtually indistinguishable from a standard RBC model without
fixed adjustment costs.
[Insert Figures 3-4 Here.]
Figures 3-4 plot impulse responses to a positive N-shock. Compared to Figure 1, the increase
in the investment rate is about 10 times smaller in general equilibrium for the lumpy investment
and partial adjustment models than that in partial equilibrium. In addition, the responses in
the lumpy investment and partial adjustment models are similar, but the lumpy investment
model brings predictions closer to those of the frictionless RBC model. The intuition is that the
partial adjustment model implies too sluggish responses of investment due to convex adjustment
costs. The extensive margin effect in the lumpy investment model raises the responses of
investment to shocks. But the price feedback effect partially offsets this extensive margin
effect. Figure 4 shows that both the interest rate and the wage rate rise. As a result, the
increase in marginal Q in the lumpy investment model is much smaller in general equilibrium
than in partial equilibrium (0.1 percent versus 1.8 percent). This in turn causes the adjustment
rate to rise by less than 1 percent as revealed in Figure 3, compared to 11 percent in partial
equilibrium.
[Insert Figures 5-6 Here.]
Figures 5-6 plot the impulse responses to a positive I-shock. Comparing with Figure 2,
we find that the effects on the investment rate is much smaller in general equilibrium than
in partial equilibrium. In addition, the impulse responses in the lumpy investment and the
partial adjustment model are similar. In contrast to the partial equilibrium case, a positive
I-shock lowers marginal Q in both the lumpy investment and partial adjustment models. The
intuition follows from equation (53) and Figure 6. The increase in the interest rate and the
wage rate lowers the profitability of the firm and hence raises the cost of investment. This
effect dominates the positive effect of investment-specific technology shock on Q. Why do the
investment rate and the adjustment rate still rise? The reason is that the increase in the I-shock
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decreases the price of new investment. Thus, it has a direct positive effect on the investment
trigger and the investment rate as revealed by equations (42) and (43), respectively.7 However,
the effect is smaller than that in partial equilibrium, due to the powerful general equilibrium
price feedback effect. Figure 5 shows that the adjustment rate rises by 1.5 percent only, which
is much smaller than 8 percent in partial equilibrium.
Next, we turn to the business cycle moments properties. Table 2 presents standard devi-
ations, autocorrelations, and contemporaneous correlations for several model economies. We
first consider the result for the frictionless RBC and partial adjustment models. It is well
known that the partial adjustment model delivers less volatile and more persistent equilibrium
quantities and prices than the frictionless RBC model because of the smoothing role of the con-
vex adjustment costs. We then introduce fixed costs into the partial adjustment model. Rows
labelled “Lumpy1” in Table 2 present the result for this lumpy investment model with the
baseline parameter values. They reveal that although impulse responses in the partial adjust-
ment model and the lumpy investment model are similar, the difference in the model predicted
second moments is non-negligible. The lumpy investment model delivers higher volatility in all
quantities and prices than the partial adjustment model as revealed in Panel A. In particular,
aggregate investment, the investment rate, and hours are 16, 13, and 28 percent, respectively,
more volatile in the lumpy investment model than in the partial adjustment model. Panel B of
Table 2 shows that the lumpy investment model predicts less persistent equilibrium quantities
and prices, which are closer to the predictions of the frictionless RBC model. Panel C of Table
2 presents contemporaneous correlations with output. Marginal Q is negatively correlated with
output for all models because a positive investment-specific technology shock lowers the price
of capital directly. All other quantities and prices move positively with output. In summary,
Table 2 demonstrates that the predictions of the lumpy investment model are closer to those
of the standard frictionless RBC model. Thus, it also suffers from a number of difficulties in
matching the US business cycle facts, as in the standard frictionless RBC model. Thomas
(2002) reports a similar finding.
So far, we have shown that under the baseline calibration, the general equilibrium price
movements dampen the extensive margin effect significantly, making predictions of the lumpy
investment model and the partial adjustment model similar. We now illustrate that the shape
parameter of the distribution function of the idiosyncratic shock is important for the extensive
margin effect. We set η = 20 and re-calibrate ξmax = 0.02232 such that the inaction rate is equal
7In contrast to the N-shock, the initial response of consumption is negative because investment crowds out
consumption as typical in models with investment-specific technology shocks.
21
Table 2. Business Cycle Moments
Y C I N Q I/K r w
A. Standard deviations (percentage)
PA 2.27 2.03 4.09 0.87 1.18 3.74 0.28 2.03
Lumpy1 2.41 2.12 4.74 1.11 1.22 4.41 0.36 2.12
Lumpy2 2.60 2.24 5.72 1.45 1.36 5.45 0.48 2.24
LumpyGK 2.59 2.22 5.44 1.46 1.32 5.11 0.46 2.22
RBC 2.81 2.36 7.58 1.95 1.67 7.46 0.60 2.36
B. Autocorrelations
PA 0.94 0.96 0.77 0.63 0.83 0.68 0.63 0.96
Lumpy1 0.93 0.96 0.73 0.60 0.78 0.64 0.60 0.96
Lumpy2 0.91 0.95 0.67 0.56 0.70 0.58 0.56 0.95
LumpyGK 0.92 0.95 0.70 0.58 0.72 0.61 0.58 0.95
RBC 0.89 0.93 0.64 0.57 0.70 0.58 0.57 0.93
C. Contemporaneous correlations with output
PA 1 0.92 0.83 0.45 -0.21 0.33 0.09 0.92
Lumpy1 1 0.89 0.81 0.47 -0.32 0.34 0.20 0.89
Lumpy2 1 0.83 0.80 0.51 -0.43 0.37 0.32 0.83
LumpyGK 1 0.83 0.83 0.51 -0.42 0.39 0.32 0.83
RBC 1 0.73 0.78 0.56 -0.53 0.43 0.44 0.73
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. RBC: the standard real business cycle model. PA: the
partial adjustment model. Lumpy1: our lumpy investment model under the baseline calibration
in Table 1. Lumpy2: our lumpy investment model with power function distribution where
η = 20 and ξmax = 0.02232. LumpyGK: our lumpy investment model with our calibrated
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) distribution.
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to 0.081. In this case, the elasticity of the adjustment rate is 20 times of that in the baseline
calibration so that the extensive margin effect is much larger. Of course, this calibration is
unreasonable because total fixed costs are too large, accounting for 4.3 percent of output, 19.1
percent of total investment spending, and 1.9 percent of capital stock.
Rows labelled “Lumpy2” in Table 2 present the result for this calibration. The result
reveals that the difference between the lumpy investment model and the partial adjustment
model becomes larger. In particular, aggregate investment in the lumpy investment model is
40 percent more volatile than in the partial adjustment model. The investment rate in the
lumpy investment model is 46 percent more volatile than in the partial adjustment model.
However, the differences in the autocorrelations and contemporaneous correlations across these
two models are small.
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) argue that for the extensive margin effect to be large, the
fixed cost distribution must be sufficiently compressed in the sense that many firms must face
nearly identical fixed costs. We have argued in Proposition 6 that the key determinant of
the extensive margin effect is the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate, but not the
compression property. We now take Gourio and Kashyap (2007) distribution H(ξ/ξmax), where
H(x) = h(x)−h(0)h(1)−h(0) and h(x) = [arctan(σ1(x− χ)) + arctan(σ2(x− 1))] / (2pi) , for χ ∈ (0, 1).
This distribution has the property that most firms bunch around ξmax and χξmax. As in Gourio
and Kashyap (2007), we set σ1 = 150 and σ2 = 33.3. Unlike their distribution with χ = 0.5,
we set χ = 0.05 so that there are many firms having small fixed costs at the size of 5 percent
of ξmax. We then set ξmax = 0.022494 to match the inaction rate of 0.081. In this case, total
fixed costs are smaller than those in our baseline calibration. They account for 1.42 percent of
output, 5.75 percent of total investment spending, and 0.58 percent of capital stock. However,
the effect of lumpy investment is much larger than in the baseline calibration, as shown in
Table 2.
Rows labelled “LumpyGK” in Table 2 present the result for the Gourio-Kashyap distri-
bution. We find that our calibrated Gourio-Kashyap distribution and the power function
distribution with η = 20 deliver similar second moments, but the former distribution gives
slightly less volatile investment and investment rate. To see the intuition, we compute the
steady-state elasticities of the adjustment rate with respect to the investment trigger for the
Gourio-Kashyap distribution and for the power function distribution. We find they are equal
to 6.28 and 20 respectively. As a result, the extensive margin effect for the Gourio-Kashyap
distribution is smaller, justifying less volatile investment. But why is the difference in equilib-
rium second moments for the two distributions so small? The intuition comes from the general
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equilibrium price feedback effect. As Proposition 6 shows, the magnitude of the wage feedback
effect is determined by the state-steady ratio R/Q. We find that it is equal to 0.145 for the
Gourio-Kashyap distribution, which is smaller than the value 0.159 for the power function dis-
tribution with η = 20, because the Gourio-Kashyap distribution is more right skewed than the
power function distribution. Thus, the price feedback effect is smaller for the Gourio-Kashyap
distribution, which makes the powerful dampening effect on investment much smaller.
5 Idiosyncratic Investment-Specific Technology Shocks
So far, we have assumed that idiosyncratic shocks are to fixed costs and are iid. In this case,
all firms choose the same target investment level, and thus the model cannot generate the spike
rate observed in the data. To allow different firms choose different target investment levels, we
introduce idiosyncratic investment-specific technology shocks.8 To keep the model tractable,
we shut down idiosyncratic fixed cost shocks. That is, we assume each firm must pay a fixed
fraction ξ of capital if it decides to make investments.
We assume that the idiosyncratic investment-specific technology shock εjt is iid and drawn
from a distribution with density φ. In this case, firm j’s dividends are given by:
Djt = Y
j
t − wtN jt −
Ijt
ztε
j
t
− ξKjt 1Ijt 6=0. (54)
We can follow similar steps to derive that firm j’s optimal investment policy is characterized
by the (S, s) policy in that there is a unique trigger value ε∗t > 0 such that the firm invests if
and only if εjt ≥ ε∗t . The trigger value ε∗t satisfies the equation:
θ
1− θ (ztε
∗
t )
1−θ
θ (ψQt)
1
θ = ξ.
The optimal target investment level is given by:
ijt =
(
ψztε
j
tQt
) 1
θ
. (55)
The marginal Q satisfies:
Qt = Et
{
βU1 (Ct+1, 1−Nt+1)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) [F1 (Kt+1, At+1Nt+1) + (1− δ + ς)Qt+1 (56)
+ξ
∫ ∞
ε∗t+1
[(
ε/ε∗t+1
) 1−θ
θ − 1
]
φ(ε)dε
]}
,
8Khan and Thomas (2008) introduce persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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where the expression in the second line represents the option value of waiting. Equation (55)
reveals that the target investment level depends on the idiosyncratic investment-specific tech-
nology shock εjt . Thus, different firms have different target investment levels. This property
helps generate the spike rate observed in the data.
Given an individual firm’s decision rules, we can conduct aggregation as in Section 3 and
show that the aggregate equilibrium sequences {Yt, Nt, Ct, It, Kt, Qt, ε∗t }t≥0 are characterized
by a system of difference equation similar to that in Proposition 2 with equations (26)-(28)
being replaced by:
It = (ψQt)
1
θ
(∫ ∞
ε∗t
(ztε)
1−θ
θ φ(ε)dε
)
Kt, (57)
Kt+1 = (1− δ + ς)Kt + ψ1− θKt
(
ztIt
Kt
)1−θ(∫ ∞
ε∗t
ε
1−θ
θ φ(ε)dε
)θ
, (58)
ξ =
θ
1− θ (ztε
∗
t )
1−θ
θ (ψQt)
1
θ , (59)
Yt = F (Kt, AtNt) = It + Ct + ξKt
∫ ∞
ε∗t
φ (ε) dε. (60)
The equilibrium dynamics are determined by parameters in preferences, technology, and
the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. Under some specific assumptions on these parameters,
we can prove an irrelevance result similar to Proposition 5.
Proposition 7 Consider the Pareto distribution with density φ (ε) = ηε−η−1, ε > 1, η >
(1− θ) /θ and specifications (38)-(39). Then any positive fixed costs do not matter for the
aggregate dynamics of the normalized variables {Y˜t, N˜t, C˜t, I˜t, K˜t, Q˜t, ε˜∗t }t≥0 in the sense that
the fixed cost parameter ξ does not affect the system of difference equations that characterizes
these normalized variables.
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to that behind Proposition 5. The Pareto
distribution has a homogeneity property making the steady state values R/Q, I/Y, C/Y and
N independent of ξ. Given the homogeneity of the preferences and technology, the dynamic
system for the normalized variables is fully determined by these steady state values and other
structural parameters except for ξ. We thus obtain the irrelevance result.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that fea-
tures micro-level investment lumpiness. We prove an exact irrelevance proposition, consistent
25
with numerical findings in Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008). We also give
conditions under which lumpy investment can be important to a first-order approximation.
Essentially, we need the fixed cost distribution satisfies two conditions: (i) The steady-state
elasticity of the adjustment rate is large so that the extensive margin effect is large. (ii) The
fixed cost distribution is right skewed so that the general equilibrium price feedback is small.
We also show numerically that introducing fixed costs to a model with convex adjustment costs
raises business cycle volatility, but reduces persistence of output, consumption, investment, and
hours. In addition, when lumpy investment becomes more important, it brings business cycle
moments closer to those in the standard frictionless RBC model.
Our model serves as a theoretical benchmark for understanding the general equilibrium ef-
fect of lumpy investment. It is useful for reconciling some debate and some numerical findings
in the literature. One limitation of our model is that it is not suitable for addressing distri-
butional asymmetry and aggregate nonlinearity. To address this issue, it is necessary to relax
the assumption of constant returns to scale. In this case, the distribution of capital is a state
variable and there is no analytical solution available. One has to use a numerical method to
approximate the distribution of capital.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: From (20), we can show that the target investment level ijt satisfies
the first-order condition:
1
zt
= g′
(
ijt
)
Et
[
βΛt+1
Λt
V¯t+1
]
. (A.1)
By equations (3), (16) and (21), we can derive equation (23). Using this equation, we define
V a
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
as the price of capital when the firm chooses to invest. It is given by:
V a
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
= Rt − i
j
t
zt
− ξjt + g(ijt )Qt (A.2)
= Rt + (1− δ + ς)Qt
+
θ
1− θz
1−θ
θ
t (ψQt)
1
θ − ξjt .
Define V n (Kt, At, zt) as the price of capital when the firm chooses not to invest. It satisfies:
V n (Kt, At, zt) = Rt + (1− δ + ς)Qt, (A.3)
which is independent of ξjt . We can then rewrite problem (20) as:
V
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
=
{
V a
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
, V n (Kt, At, zt)
}
. (A.4)
Clearly, there is a unique cutoff value ξ∗t given in (22) satisfying the condition:
V a (Kt, At, zt, ξ∗t ) = V
n (Kt, At, zt) , (A.5)
V a
(
Kt, At, zt, ξ
j
t
)
≥ V n (Kt, At, zt) if and only if ξjt ≤ ξ∗t . (A.6)
Because the support of ξjt is [0, ξmax] , the investment trigger is given by min {ξ∗t , ξmax} .
When ξ∗t ≤ ξmax, we show that:
V¯t =
∫ ξmax
0
V (Kt, At, zt, ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
=
∫ ξmax
ξ∗t
V n (Kt, At, zt)φ(ξ)dξ +
∫ ξ∗t
0
V a (Kt, At, zt, ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
= V n (Kt, At, zt) +
∫ ξ∗t
0
[V a (Kt, At, zt, ξ)− V n (Kt, At, zt)]φ(ξ)dξ.
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We use equations (A.2), (A.3) and (22) to derive
V a (Kt, At, zt, ξ)− V n (Kt, At, zt) = θ1− θz
1−θ
θ
t (ψQt)
1
θ − ξ (A.7)
= ξ∗t − ξ.
Using the above two equations, (A.3), and (21), we obtain (24). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: From (12), we deduce that all firms choose the same labor-capital
ratio nt. We thus obtain Nt = ntKt. We then derive
Yt =
∫
Y jt dj =
∫
F
(
Kjt , AtN
j
t
)
dj =
∫
F
(
1, Atn
j
t
)
Kjt dj
= F (1, Atnt)
∫
Kjt dj = F (1, Atnt)Kt = F (Kt, AtNt) ,
which gives the first equality in equation (28). As a result, we use equation (12) and njt = nt
to show:
AtF2(Kt, AtNt) = wt. (A.8)
By the constant return to scale property of F, we also have:
Rt = F1(Kt, AtNt). (A.9)
Equation (25) follows from equation (22) and (9). We next derive aggregate investment:
It =
∫
Ijt
zt
dj =
∫
ijt
zt
Kjt dj = Kt
∫ ξ∗t
0
z
1
θ
−1
t (ψQt)
1
θ φ (ξ) dξ,
where the second equality uses the definition of ijt , the third equality uses a law of large numbers
and the optimal investment rule (23). We thus obtain (26).
We turn to the law of motion for capital. By definition,
Kt+1 =
∫ 1
0
[
(1− δ) + g(ijt )
]
Kjt dj.
Substituting optimal investment in equation (23) and using equation (26), we obtain (27).
Equation (30) follows from substituting equations (9), (26), (25), and (A.9) into equation
(24). Equation (29) follows from equations (9), (10) and (A.8). Finally, equation (28) follows
from a law of large number, the market clearing condition (11), and Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Let λt and λtQt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (28)
and (27). We derive the following first-order conditions:
Ct : U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) = λt, (A.10)
Nt : U2 (Ct, 1−Nt) = λtAtF2 (Kt, AtNt) , (A.11)
It : 1 = QtψKθt z
1−θ
t I
−θ
t
[∫ ξ∗t
0
φ(ξ)dξ
]θ
, (A.12)
Kt+1 : λtQt = Etβλt+1
[
F1 (Kt+1, At+1Nt+1) + (1− δ + ς)Qt+1 −
∫ ξ∗t+1
0
ξφ(ξ)dξ
]
+Etβλt+1Qt+1
 θψ
1− θ
(
It+1zt+1
Kt+1
)1−θ(∫ ξ∗t+1
0
φ(ξ)dξ
)θ , (A.13)
ξ∗t : λtξ
∗
t φ (ξ
∗
t )Kt = λtQt
ψθ
1− θKt (ztIt/Kt)
1−θ
[∫ ξ∗t
0
φ(ξ)dξ
]θ−1
φ (ξ∗t ) . (A.14)
Equation (A.12) gives (26). Equations (A.10) and (A.11) together give equation (29). Using
equations (A.12) and (A.14), we can derive equation (25). From (25) and (26), we can derive
θ
1− θ
It
Kt
=
∫ ξ∗t
0
ξ∗t φ(ξ)dξ. (A.15)
Using this equation and equations (A.12) and (A.13), we can derive (30). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We first observe that the deterministic steady-state values of At
and zt are equal to 1. In steady state, equations (26) and (25) imply that:
I
K
= (ψQ)
1
θ
∫ ξ∗
0
φ(ξ)dξ, (A.16)
ξ∗ =
θ
1− θ (ψQ)
1
θ , (A.17)
From these two equations, we obtain:
I
K
= ξ∗
1− θ
θ
∫ ξ∗
0
φ(ξ)dξ. (A.18)
In steady state, equation (27) becomes:
δ − ς = ψ
1− θ (I/K)
1−θ
[∫ ξ∗
0
φ(ξ)dξ
]θ
. (A.19)
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Substituting equation (A.18) into the above equation yields equation (31). The expression on
the right-hand side of this equation increases with ξ∗. Given the condition in this proposition,
there is a unique interior solution ξ∗ ∈ [0, ξmax].
Equation (32) follows from (A.17). Equations (A.18) and (A.19) imply that:
δ − ς = ψ
1− θ
I
K
(
ξ∗ (1− θ)
θ
)−θ
. (A.20)
From this equation and equation (32), we obtain (33). The other equations in the proposition
follow from the steady-state versions of equations (29)-(30). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: For the power function distribution, we have
∫ ξ
0 φ(x)dx =
[
ξ
ξmax
]η
,
and ∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
=
η
η + 1
. (A.21)
We can then use equation (31) to derive equation (37). Equation (37) implies that the invest-
ment trigger ξ∗ increases with ξmax. It follows from equation (32) and (33) that Q and I/K
also increase with ξmax.
Using equation (A.18), we can compute the steady-state value of the ratio of option value
of waiting to the investment rate:∫ ξ∗
0 [ξ
∗ − ξ]φ(ξ)dξ
I/K
=
∫ ξ∗
0 [ξ
∗ − ξ]φ(ξ)dξ
1−θ
θ ξ
∗ ∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
=
θ
1− θ
[
1−
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
]
.
Using this equation and equation (33), we derive the steady-state value of the ratio of the
option value to the price of capital:∫ ξ∗
0 [ξ
∗ − ξ]φ(ξ)dξ
Q
=
∫ ξ∗
0 [ξ
∗ − ξ]φ(ξ)dξ
I/K
I/K
Q
= θ (δ − ς)
[
1−
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
]
.
Substituting it into equation (36), we obtain:
Q =
β
1− β (1− δ + ς)
{
F1 (K,N) + θ (δ − ς)
[
1−
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
]
Q
}
. (A.22)
This equation implies that:
R = F1 (K,N) =
αY
K
(A.23)
= Q
{
1
β
− (1− δ + ς)− θ (δ − ς)
[
1−
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
]}
.
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Thus, by (A.21), R/Q is independent of ξmax.
Using equations (A.21), (33) and (A.23), we derive the steady-state investment-output ratio:
I
Y
=
I/K
Y/K
=
α (δ − ς) (1− θ)
1
β − (1− δ + ς)− θ(δ−ς)η+1
, (A.24)
which is independent of ξmax. We next compute the ratio of total fixed costs to output using
equations (A.24) and (33):
K
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
Y
=
∫ ξ∗
0
ξφ(ξ)dξ
I/Y
I/K
=
α
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
Q
{
1
β − (1− δ + ς)− θ(δ−ς)η+1
}
=
αη/ (η + 1)
1
β − (1− δ + ς)− θ(δ−ς)η+1
ξ∗1+η−θψθθ
ξηmax (1− θ)θ
=
αη/ (η + 1) (δ − ς) θ
1
β − (1− δ + ς)− θ(δ−ς)η+1
,
which is independent of ξmax.
Using the resource constraint, we can compute the steady-state consumption-output ratio:
C
Y
= 1− I
Y
− K
∫ ξ∗
0 ξφ(ξ)dξ
Y
.
Thus, C/Y is independent of ξmax.
To show N is independent of ξmax, we use the assumption on preferences and the steady-
state version of equation (35) to derive:
(1− α)Y
N
= Cv′ (1−N) or Cv
′ (1−N)
1− γ . (A.25)
We obtain the desired result because C/Y is independent of ξmax.
Because Q increases with ξmax and R/Q is independent of ξmax, R must increase with ξmax.
Since R = f ′(k) and ∂R/∂ξmax > 0, we must have ∂k/∂ξmax < 0, where k = K/N. Because
N is independent of ξmax, we obtain ∂K/∂ξmax < 0 . Since w = f(k) − f ′(k)k, so we have
∂w/∂k > 0 and ∂w∂ξmax =
∂w
∂k
∂k
∂ξmax
< 0. Since Y = F (K,N), we have ∂Y/∂ξmax < 0. Since C/Y
and I/Y are independent of ξmax, we also have ∂C/∂ξmax < 0 and ∂I/∂ξmax < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: We focus on the utility function U (C, 1−N) = C1−γ1−γ v(1 − N),
where γ > 0, 6= 1. The proof for the other utility function in the proposition is similar. We
then have Λt = C
−γ
t v(1−Nt), and
U2 (Ct, 1−Nt)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) =
1
γ − 1
Ctv
′(1−Nt)
v(1−Nt) .
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Using Proposition 2 and the assumptions, we can characterize the equilibrium dynamics by the
following system of difference equations:
It = (ψQt)
1
θ z
1−θ
θ
t Kt
(
ξ∗t
ξmax
)η
, (A.26)
Kt+1 = (1− δ + ς)Kt + ψ1− θKt (ztIt/Kt)
1−θ
(
ξ∗t
ξmax
)θη
, (A.27)
ξ∗t =
θ
1− θz
1−θ
θ
t (ψQt)
1
θ , (A.28)
1
γ − 1
Ctv
′(1−Nt)
v(1−Nt) =
(1− α)Yt
Nt
, (A.29)
Yt = F (Kt, AtNt) = It + Ct +Kt
η
η + 1
(ξ∗t )
η+1
(ξmax)
η , (A.30)
Qt = Et
{
βC−γt+1v(1−Nt+1)
C−γt v(1−Nt)
[
αYt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ + ς)Qt+1 + 1
η + 1
(ξ∗t )
η+1
(ξmax)
η
]}
.
Using the steady-state equations from Corollary 1 and the definition of normalization,
Xt = XX˜t for any variable Xt, we can rewrite the above system of difference equations as
follows:
I˜t = Q˜
1
θ
t z˜
1−θ
θ
t K˜t
(
ξ˜∗t
)η
, (A.31)
K˜t+1 = (1− δ + ς)K˜t + ψ [(δ − ς) (1− θ)]
1−θ
1− θ K˜t
(
z˜tI˜t/K˜t
)1−θ (
ξ˜∗t
)θη
, (A.32)
ξ˜∗t = z˜
1−θ
θ
t Q˜
1
θ
t , (A.33)
1
γ − 1
C˜tv
′(1−NN˜t)
v(1−NN˜t)
=
Y
C
(1− α)Y˜t
NN˜t
, (A.34)
Y˜t = K˜αt (A˜tN˜t)
1−α =
I
Y
I˜t +
C
Y
C˜t +
(
1− I
Y
− C
Y
)
K˜t
(
ξ˜∗t
)η+1
, (A.35)
Q˜t = Et
{
βC˜−γt+1v(1−NN˜t+1)
C˜−γt v(1−NN˜t)
[
R
Q
Y˜t+1
K˜t+1
+ (1− δ + ς) Q˜t+1∫ ξ∗
0 (ξ
∗ − ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
Q
(
ξ˜∗t
)η+1]}
. (A.36)
Note that equation (A.22) implies:∫ ξ∗
0 (ξ
∗ − ξ)φ(ξ)dξ
Q
=
1
β
− (1− δ + ς)− R
Q
.
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The dynamics of the above system of nonlinear difference equations are fully determined by the
steady-state ratios R/Q and C/Y, I/Y and the steady-state value N , structural parameters
{α, β, γ, δ, ψ, ς, θ, η}, the function v(1−N), and the process of exogenous technology shocks A˜t
and z˜t. By Corollary 1, R/Q, C/Y , I/Y and the steady-state value N are independent of the
nonconvex adjustment costs parameter ξmax. Thus, we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We log-linearize the nonlinear dynamic system in Proposition 2
and obtain equations (45), (43), (42), (44), (46) and
Qˆt + uC,CCˆt − uC,N Nˆt = Et
(
uC,CCˆt+1 − uC,N Nˆt+1
)
+ β (1− δ + ς)EtQˆt+1 (A.37)
+
βF1
Q
Et
[
fKKKˆt+1 + fKN (Aˆt+1 + Nˆt+1)
]
+βθ(δ − ς)Et(Iˆt+1 − Kˆt+1)− β (ξ
∗)2 φ(ξ∗)
Q
Etξˆ
∗
t+1,
where we have used (A.15) in (30) to derive the above equation. Following King, Plosser
and Rebelo (2002), we denote the elasticities of marginal utility to its arguments by uN,C =
CU21(C,1−N)
U2(C,1−N) , uN,N =
NU22(C,1−N)
U2(C,1−N) , uC,C =
CU11(C,1−N)
U1(C,1−N) , uC,N =
NU12(Ct,1−N)
U1(C,1−N) . We then log-
linearize equation (29) to obtain equation (49). We log-linearize the equation U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) =
βEt [U (Ct+1, 1−Nt+1) rt+1] to obtain (48).
We now use equation (43) to derive
βθ(δ − ς)Et(Iˆt+1 − Kˆt+1) = β(δ − ς)Et
[
Qˆt+1 + (1− θ)zˆt+1 + θξ
∗φ(ξ∗)∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
ξˆ∗t+1
]
. (A.38)
By equations (A.18) and (33), we have:
θ
1− θ
I
K
= ξ∗
∫ ξ∗
0
φ(ξ)dθ = (δ − ς)θQ.
Thus,
β(δ − ς) θξ
∗φ(ξ∗)∫ ξ∗
0 φ(ξ)dξ
= β(δ − ς)θ (ξ
∗)2 φ(ξ∗)
(δ − ς)θQ = β
(ξ∗)2 φ(ξ∗)
Q
.
Using this equation and plugging equation (A.38) into (A.37), we obtain:
Qˆt + uC,CCˆt − uC,N Nˆt (A.39)
= Et
(
uC,CCˆt+1 − uC,N Nˆt+1
)
+ βEtQˆt+1 + β(δ − ς)(1− θ)Etzˆt+1
+
βF1
Q
Et
[
KF11(K,N)
F1(K,N)
Kˆt+1 +
NF12(K,N)
F1(K,N)
(Aˆt+1 + Nˆt+1)
]
.
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Because F is linearly homogenous, we have
NF22 +KF21 = 0, KF11 +NF12 = 0.
We can then derive:
KF11(K,N)
F1(K,N)
Kˆt+1 +
NF12(K,N)
F1(K,N)
(Aˆt+1 + Nˆt+1) =
KF11(K,N)
F1(K,N)
(
Kˆt+1 − Aˆt+1 − Nˆt+1
)
,
wˆt+1 =
KF21
F2
Kˆt+1 +
NF22
F2
Nˆt+1 +
(
1 +
NF22
F2
)
Aˆt+1
= Aˆt+1 +
KF21
F2
(
Kˆt+1 − Aˆt+1 − Nˆt+1
)
.
Using the above two equations, we can derive equation (47) from equation (A.39). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: To prove this proposition, we need two lemmas:
Lemma 1 Suppose δ > ς. Then the steady-state investment trigger ε∗ is given by the unique
solution to the equation:
(δ − ς) (ε∗) (1−θ)
2
θ =
ξ1−θψ
(1− θ)θ θ(1−θ)
∫ ∞
ε∗
ε
1−θ
θ φ(ε)dε.
Given this value ε∗, the steady-state value of Q is given by:
Q =
ξθ
βψ
(
1− θ
θ
)θ
(ε∗)θ−1 .
The other steady-state values (I,K,C,N) satisfy:
I
K
= β (δ − ς) (1− θ)Q,
F (K,N) = I + C + ξK
∫ ∞
ε∗
φ (ε) dε,
U2 (C, 1−N)
U1 (C, 1−N) = F2 (K,N) ,
Q =
1
1− β (1− δ + ς)
{
F1 (K,N) + ξ
∫ ∞
ε∗
[( ε
ε∗
) 1−θ
θ − 1
]
φ(ε)dε
}
.
Lemma 2 Consider the Pareto distribution with density φ (ε) = ηε−η−1, ε > 1, η > (1− θ) /θ,
and the specifications in (38)-(39). Assume δ > ς and the parameter values are such that:
ε∗ ≡
[
ξ1−θψη
(δ − ς) (θη + θ − 1)
(
θ
1− θ
)θ]1/(θ+η−1)
> 1.
Then the steady-state trigger value is ε∗, the steady-state values R/Q, I/Y,C/Y and N are
independent of ξ.
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We omit the proofs, which follow from similar arguments in the proofs of Proposition 4
and Corollary 1. We now turn to the proof of Proposition 7. We focus on the utility function
U (C, 1−N) = C1−γ1−γ v(1 − N), where γ > 0, 6= 1. The proof for the other utility function
specification in the proposition is similar. We then have Λt = C
−γ
t v(1−Nt), and
U2 (Ct, 1−Nt)
U1 (Ct, 1−Nt) =
1
γ − 1
Ctv
′(1−Nt)
v(1−Nt) .
Using the Pareto distribution function and the equations in Section 5, we can characterize the
equilibrium dynamics by the following system of difference equations:
It =
ξ(1− θ)
θ
η
η − 1−θθ
ε∗−ηt Kt,
Kt+1 = (1− δ + ς)Kt + ψ1− θK
θ
t (ztI)
1−θ
(
η
η − 1−θθ
ε
∗ 1−θ
θ
−η
t
)θ
,
ξ =
θ
1− θ (ztεt)
1−θ
θ
(
βψEt
[
Cγt v(1−Nt+1)
Cγt+1v(1−Nt)
Qt+1
]) 1
θ
,
Qt =
αYt
Kt
+ β (1− δ + ς)Et
[
Cγt v(1−Nt+1)
Cγt+1v(1−Nt)
Qt+1
]
+ ξ
1−θ
θ
η − 1−θθ
ε∗−ηt ,
Yt = Kαt (AtNt)
1−α = It + Ct + ξKtε
∗−η
t ,
1
γ − 1
v′(1−Nt)
v(1−Nt) =
1
Ct
(1− α)Yt
Nt
.
Using the definition of normalization, Xt = XX˜t for any variable Xt, we can rewrite the
above system of equations as follows:
I˜t = ε˜
∗−η
t K˜t,
K˜t+1 = (1− δ + ς)K˜t + (δ − ς)K˜θt
(
z˜tI˜t
)1−θ
ε˜∗1−θ−ηθt ,
1 = (z˜tε˜t)
1−θ
θ
(
Et
[
C˜γt v(1−NN˜t+1)
C˜γt+1v(1−NNt)
Q˜t+1
]) 1
θ
,
Q˜t =
R
Q
Y˜t
K˜t
+ β (1− δ + ς)Et
[
C˜γt v(1−NNt+1)
C˜γt+1v(1−NNt)
Q˜t+1
]
+[1− β (1− δ + ς)−R/Q]ε˜∗−ηt ,
Y˜t = K˜αt (A˜tN˜t)
1−α =
I
Y
I˜t +
C
Y
C˜t +
(
1− I
Y
− C
Y
)
K˜tε˜
∗−η
t ,
35
1
γ − 1
Nv′(1−NN˜t)
v(1−NNt) =
(1− α)Y
C
1
C˜t
Y˜t
N˜t
.
The dynamics of the above system of nonlinear difference equations are fully determined by
the steady-state ratios R/Q and C/Y, I/Y and steady-state value N , structural parameters
{α, β, γ, η, δ, θ, ς, ψ}, the function v(1−N), and the process of exogenous technology shocks A˜t
and z˜t. By Lemma 2, R/Q, C/Y , I/Y and the steady-state value N are independent of the
nonconvex adjustment costs parameter ξ. Thus, we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to an N-shock in partial equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) to a standard deviation positive shock to the labor-
augmenting technology in partial equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model. Lumpy: lumpy
investment model.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to an I-shock in partial equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) to a standard deviation positive shock to the
investment-specific technology in partial equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model. Lumpy:
lumpy investment model.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to an N-shock in general equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of quantities to a standard deviation positive shock
to the labor-augmenting technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to an N-shock in general equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of prices to a standard deviation positive shock
to the labor-augmenting technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of an I-shock in general equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of quantities to a standard deviation positive shock
to the investment-specific technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of an I-shock in general equilibrium. This figure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of prices to a standard deviation positive shock
to the investment-specific technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
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